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I. INTRODUCTION
Every day of the year, every hour of the day, the phones are ringing at L.
L. Bean's famous mail-order store in Freeport, Maine.
When customers pay for their duck shoes, camping gear or other items
ordered from the company's catalogs, they get a little break. That is because
L. L. Bean does not charge state sales taxes on the goods it ships to custom-
ers outside of Maine.
Although mail-order customers are supposed to pay sales taxes, states
have no effective way of forcing them to do so because of a 1967 Supreme
Court decision that said most mail-order firms cannot be required to collect
the taxes.'
The states' inability to collect taxes on out-of-state mail-order
sales constitutes a major fiscal problem. The federal government's
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations estimates
that states are losing as much as 1.5 billion dollars each year in
unpaid out-of-state mail-order purchase taxes.'
II. THE PURPOSES AND INCIDENTS OF THE USE TAX ON OUT-OF-
STATE MAIL-ORDER SALES
In addition to raising revenue, the compensating use tax serves
two purposes: (1) The use tax helps local sellers to compete with
retail dealers in other states who are subject to a lesser tax burden;
and (2) the use tax avoids the likelihood of draining the taxing
state's revenue by removing buyers' incentive or temptation to go
bargain hunting by mail orders or through other means to escape
payment of the tax on in-state sales.3
1. 43 Cong. Q. 2571 (Dec. 7, 1985).
2. Preliminary Draft, "State and Local Taxation of Interstate Mail Order Sales," Ad-
visory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 7, (Aug. 23, 1985) [hereinafter cited as
ACIR]. This Advisory Commission is the national, bipartisan commission established by
Congress in 1959 to monitor the American federal system and make recommendations for
change. Its 26 members include officials from federal, state, and local governments as well as
representatives of the general public. See News Release of ACIR September 30, 1985, P.R.
85-16 at 3.
3. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. ,. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 577 (1983). For a
discussion by the author of these purposes, see P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMrrArONS ON STATE
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The legislatures of states with sales taxes could not plug these
economic leaks by extending the reach of the sales tax. One reason
was the idea that a state could not, consistently with the due pro-
cess clause, tax extraterritorial sales.4 Prior to the Supreme Court's
1940 decision in McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co.,5
it was assumed that an interstate sale was immune from state or
local taxation.' Later, McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co.7 placed severe
constitutional constraints on a destination state's ability to tax a
sale consummated in another state. These restrictions on the
states' taxing power enabled residents of states with sales taxes to
make their purchases either tax free or at a lower tax rate beyond
the territorial limits of the taxing jurisdiction. Purchasers either
could travel beyond the borders of their state, use the telephone,
mail orders, or buy from solicitors.
To protect their revenue bases and local businesses, the states
that have sales taxes also have enacted a use tax. Under this tax a
person buying something from an out-of-state source is liable for a
use tax at a rate identical to the sales tax in the purchaser's home
state. Local governments later began imposing use taxes. State and
local sales and use taxes are levied on the final purchaser, but are
collected generally through the seller. The out-of-state seller has
resisted collection of the use tax on both commerce clause and due
process clause grounds. The purposes and consequences of the
compensating use tax, however, have been frankly recognized by
the Supreme Court and do not militate against the tax's constitu-
tionality.8 In resolving the commerce and due process clause ques-
tions, the courts have faced the basic issue of what kinds of contact
or activity the out-of-state seller must have with the taxing state
so that these constitutional attacks can be resisted successfully.
III. NECESSARY NEXUS FOR COLLECTING USE TAXES FROM OUT-
OF-STATE SELLERS
A. Seller's Personnel in the Taxing State
In order to resolve whether a constitutionally adequate basis
existed for a state's requiring a seller to collect a use tax, courts
AND LOCAL TAXATION § 10:6 (1981).
4. See Lowndes, State Taxation of Interstate Sales, 7 Miss. L.J. 223, 228-29 (1935).
5. 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
6. See Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 262 U.S. 506, 514-15 (1923).
7. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
8. See Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941); Henneford v. Silas
Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 586-87 (1937).
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have examined various activities and combinations of activities by
the out-of-state seller. The seller's chief constitutional objections
to use tax collection have been the commerce and due process
clauses.9
A familiar type of connection between the out-of-state seller
and the taxing state has been the out-of-state seller's solicitation of
business in the taxing state. This solicitation of business may be by
solicitors who work from offices in the taxing state; by out-of-state
firms that sell through traveling salesmen or independent contrac-
tors in the taxing state, but have no offices in the taxing state; by
mail; or by sophisticated technological methods, such as toll-free
(800) telephone sales, computer marketing via home computer
link-ups, and computer terminal "catalogs" for direct sales that are
strategically located in factory cafeterias, supermarkets, and other
places.10
A state's power to enforce tax collection from an out-of-state
firm that had general sales agents operating from offices in the tax-
ing state was sustained at a relatively early date in Felt & Terrant
Manufacturing Co. v. Gallagher." In Gallagher the seller, an out-
of-state manufacturer, resisted collecting the use tax for sales of
goods made in another state. Because the seller maintained an of-
fice in the taxing state from which sales agents solicited orders, the
seller's constitutional objections to coerced collection of the tax did
not persuade the Court. The out-of-state seller may have no office,
branch, warehouse, or general agents in the taxing state; the seller
may never have qualified to do business in the taxing state; and its
only business may be done through traveling salesmen who solicit
the orders that the out-of-state seller accepts and fills. The Su-
preme Court sustained the out-of-state seller's collection of the use
tax in this type of factual situation in General Trading Co. v.
State .Tax Commission.12
A comparison of General Trading with McLeod v. J.E.
Dilworth Co.'" raises the interesting question whether a lesser
nexus is required to compel the out-of-state seller to collect a use
9. For a detailed and perceptive analysis of the cases dealing with the out-of-state
seller's collection of the use tax, see Simet, The Concept of "Nexus" and State Use and
Unapportioned Gross Receipts Taxes, 73 Nw. L. REv. 112 (1978). For a treatment of this
subject by the author, see P. HARTMAN, supra note 3 § 10:8. For a treatment by a leading
authority in the field, see J. HELLERSTEIN, 1 STATE TAXATION § 6.7(2) (1983).
10. See ACIR supra note 2, at 5-6.
11. 306 U.S. 62 (1939).
12. 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
13. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
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tax than is necessary to impose a sales tax. The facts in General
Trading, a use tax collection case, are similar to the facts in
Dilworth, a sales tax case. In both cases the only nexus between
the seller and the taxing state was the seller's employment of trav-
eling salesmen in the state imposing the tax. In both cases the
solicited orders were accepted out-of-state and the seller shipped
the goods from an out-of-state source in response to the orders the
salesmen solicited. In both cases the out-of-state seller parted with
title to the goods in his own state. Yet the Court held that a valid
judgment properly could be taken against the out-of-state General
Trading seller in the buyer's state for the amount of the use tax
the state imposed on the purchaser. The Court further held that
the state could require the out-of-state seller to collect the tax for
the state.14 On the other side of the coin, the Court held it consti-
tutionally impermissible to impose a sales tax in Dilworth.15 It is
not clear whether the tax ran afoul of the commerce clause or the
due process clause or both.
B. Solicitation by Independent Contractors
Apparently in an effort to get around the doctrine of General
Trading, which upheld collection of the use tax when the out-of-
state seller solicited through its own traveling salesmen, out-of-
state sellers resorted to solicitation by independent contractors. In
Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,8 in which the out-of-state seller solicited
orders in the taxing state through independent wholesalers and
jobbers, the Court found a sufficient nexus and sustained the
state's requirement that the out-of-state seller collect the use tax.
Although the jobbers and wholesalers were regarded as "indepen-
dent contractors," the Court determined that the jobbers and
wholesalers had continuously engaged in soliciting orders for the
seller in the taxing state. This continuous solicitation was sufficient
to satisfy due process requirements; nor did the tax violate the
commerce clause. The Scripto Court believed that the distinction
between independent contractors and employee solicitors found in
General Trading was "without constitutional significance."17 Both
methods of solicitation should be effective in creating and holding
the market for the seller's goods.
14. Id.
15. 322 U.S. at 331. For a criticism of Dilworth by the author, see P. HARTMAN, supra
note 3, at §§ 10:2 and 10:4.
16. 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
17. Id. at 211.
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C. Out-of-State Mail-Order Sales When Seller Has a Separate
Retail Outlet in the Taxing State
In a number of instances the Court has grappled with the is-
sue of whether the presence of an out-of-state mail-order seller's
local outlet within the taxing state is a sufficient connection to re-
quire the seller to collect and remit the use tax, even though the
seller's separate out-of-state department handles the mail-order
sales to purchasers within the taxing state. The Court first ad-
dressed that issue in Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.18 Sears, a
foreign corporation authorized to do business in the taxing State of
Iowa, was departmentalized: the mail-order and retail outlet opera-
tions were separately administered. Sears conducted business in
the taxing state through local retail stores, yet maintained a dis-
tinct out-of-state department that handled only mail orders. Sears'
out-of-state mail-order operations accepted orders from purchasers
in the taxing state. Sears' agents in the taxing state, although not
directly involved in the solicitation of the mail-order sales, often
helped in processing the mail orders, which Sears filled by direct
shipments from an out-of-state branch to the purchasers in the
taxing state. As applied, Iowa's use tax statute required Sears to
collect use taxes on out-of-state mall orders shipped into Iowa.
Sears resisted the collection of the Iowa use tax on commerce
clause and due process clause grounds. The simple issue was
whether the existence of the retail stores in the taxing state, al-
though separable from Sears' out-of-state mail-order sales, consti-
tuted a sufficient connection to allow the state to require Sears to
collect the use tax on the mail-order sales, which Sears accepted
and filled out-of-state. The Court had little trouble requiring Sears
to collect the use tax on the mail-order sales. The fact that Sears'
business operation was departmentalized-the mail-order and re-
tail store operations were separately administered-did not pre-
vent the Court's finding of a nexus sufficient to require Sears' col-
lection of the use tax on its out-of-state mail orders. Irrespective of
whether Sears' in-state outlets solicited the direct mail-order sales,
the Court was of the opinion that the taxing state was justified in
requiring use tax collection because the out-of-state mail orders
were related to Sears' overall course of business in the taxing state.
Sears' local activities in the taxing state benefited from the protec-
tion and services that the state provided. Nelson v. Montgomery
18. 312 U.S. 359 (1941).
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Ward & Co.,19 a companion case to Sears Roebuck, involved a sim-
ilar fact pattern. In Montgomery Ward, however, the local retail
outlets did engage in some local advertising of the out-of-state
mail-order merchandise. The Court held that the state could re-
quire Montgomery Ward to collect the use tax.
In a much later case, National Geographic Society v. Califor-
nia Board of Equalization,2 0 the Court held that neither local re-
tail stores' assistance in processing the mail orders, as in Sears
Roebuck, nor the local retail store's advertisement of the out-of-
state mail-order business, as in Montgomery Ward, was crucial to
the Court's decision. 21 In National Geographic the out-of-state
seller was departmentalized: it had both an interstate mail-order
business and local offices within the taxing State of California that
solicited advertising. The local offices and the mail-order business
within the taxing state were separately administered. The National
Geographic Society, a nonprofit corporation of the District of Co-
lumbia, maintained two offices in California that solicited advertis-
ing copy for the Society's monthly magazine. The offices, however,
performed no activities related to the Society's interstate mail-or-
der business, located in the District of Columbia, which sold maps,
atlases, globes, and books. California purchasers mailed their or-
ders for these items directly to the Society's headquarters in the
District of Columbia, and the Society delivered these items to pur-
chasers in California by mail from the Society's District of Colum-
bia headquarters. As applied, California's use tax statute required
the Society to collect use taxes on the mail-order sales.
The Society resisted payment of the use tax on two grounds:
(1) The Society's contacts with its California customers related
solely to its mail-order sales through a common carrier or the
mails; and (2) the Society's two California offices played no part in
the sales activity. As a consequence, it was argued that the Soci-
ety's collection of the use tax assessed against the mail-order sales
violated both the commerce and the due process clauses. In short,
the Society argued that a nexus or relationship must exist not only
between the seller and the taxing state, but a transactional nexus
also must exist between the seller's mail-order sales and its activity
within the taxing state.
If the Court had accepted the Society's position, then the stat-
19. 312 U.S. 373 (1941).
20. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).




utorily imposed duty to collect the use tax would be impermissible
under the Court's holding in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Revenue,23 which will be examined in detail below. In Bel-
las Hess the Court held that the out-of-state seller's mail-order
sales to purchasers in the taxing state were insufficient to require
the out-of-state mail-order seller's collection of the use tax.24 The
Court in National Geographic did not apply Bellas Hess. The Na-
tional Geographic Court upheld the requirement that the Society
collect the California use tax on the mail-order sales. The Court
reasoned that the
requisite nexus for requiring an out-of-state seller (Society) to collect and pay
the use tax is not whether the duty to collect the use tax relates to the seller's
activities carried on within the state, but simply whether the facts demon-
strate "some definite link, some minimum connection, between [the State
and] the person . . . it seeks to tax. 25
National Geographic thus adopts the rule that a transactional
nexus between the out-of-state mail-order sales and the taxing
state is not essential. The nexus linchpin for use tax collection by
the seller is that a connection need not be established for the par-
ticular activity. Nexus depends upon the totality of the out-of-
state seller's activities within the taxing state. Although the Soci-
ety's offices for soliciting advertising were departments separate
and distinct from the mail-order sales, the Court applied the con-
cept of nexus for due process clause purposes to the Society's ac-
tivities as a whole, and not to the separate mail-order activity. In
this respect the case is similar to Sears Roebuck and Montgomery
Ward, which also involved the departmentalization of the mail-or-
der and retail store operations. The National Geographic Court
noted that the Society's offices had the "advantage of the same
municipal services-fire and police protection, and the like-as
they would have had if their activities, as in Sears and Montgom-
ery Ward, included assistance to the mail-order operations that
generated the use taxes." 28
The Court summarily answered the Society's commerce clause
objection to the collection of the use tax. The Court pointed out
that the out-of-state seller was exposed to no risk of double taxa-
tion because the tax was imposed only on sales to in-state custom-
23. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
24. For criticism of Bellas Hess by the author, see infra notes 43-129 and accompany-
ing text.
25. 430 U.S. at 561 (quoting Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954)).
26. 430 U.S. at 561.
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ers. The customer's identification as a resident of the taxing state
was obvious, and the Society became liable for the tax only by fail-
ing or refusing to collect it from the resident customer.17
D. Mail-Order Solicitation of Sales and Media Advertising as a
Basis for Requiring Collection of the Use Tax by the Out-of-State
Seller
In all the situations thus far mentioned, where the Court re-
quired the out-of-state seller to collect the use tax, the seller en-
gaged in business within the taxing state through independent con-
tractors or employees. In General Trading the seller engaged in
business within the taxing state through traveling salesmen who
did not operate from an office within the state. 8 In Scripto, Inc.
the seller engaged in business within the taxing state through inde-
pendent contractors.2 In Sears Roebuck, Montgomery Ward, and
National Geographic, the sellers operated offices within the taxing
state, but these offices were separate from the out-of-state mail-
order sales in question.30 In the following cases, however, when the
Court thought the nexus was slimmer, the Court did not find a
sufficient nexus between the taxing state and the out-of-state seller
to require the seller to collect the use tax.
1. Miller Brothers Co. v. Maryland
When the taxing state sought to satisfy the due process nexus
requirement for collection of its use tax based on the out-of-state
seller's deliveries of goods into the taxing state, as well as radio,
newspaper, and circular advertising, the attempt at collection
could not pass due process clause scrutiny. In Miller Brothers Co.
v. Marylands' the seller, a Delaware furniture dealer, refused to
serve as a use tax collector for Maryland under a statute that re-
quired the nonresident seller to collect a use tax from Maryland
residents who made retail purchases at the seller's Delaware store.
Some of the sales were cash-and-carry; others involved the delivery
of goods into Maryland by the seller's private truck or by common
carrier.3 2 The out-of-state seller neither was qualified to do busi-
27. Id. at 558.
28. 322 U.S. at 337.
29. 362 U.S. at 209.
30. See supra, notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
31. 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
32. Id. at 350-51.
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ness in the taxing state; nor did the seller send its salesmen, solici-
tors, or agents into the state. No orders were taken by mail or tele-
phone. The out-of-state seller, however, advertised in newspapers
and on radio stations in Delaware. Although no advertisements
were directed specifically to customers of the taxing state, never-
theless the advertisements did reach Maryland customers. Addi-
tionally, the seller periodically mailed circulars to all its former
customers, including Maryland customers.
By a five to four vote, Miller Brothers torpedoed Maryland's
use tax collection statute as applied to this extra-state seller on the
ground that there was not a sufficient connection between the tax-
ing state and the seller to satisfy due process clause requirements.
Although there was a commerce clause objection to the tax, the
Court did not reach that issue. The taxing state justified the impo-
sition of the collection requirement primarily on the grounds that
the seller's newspaper and radio ads were known to reach the resi-
dents of the taxing state, and that the seller's trucks delivered
purchases within the taxing state for local use. The Miller Broth-
ers majority declared that there was a "wide gulf" between this
activity and the aggressive and regular solicitation by traveling
salesmen within a taxing state found in General Trading.3 3 Nor
did the delivery of goods by the Miller Brothers seller to customers
within the taxing state satisfy due process clause requirements.
The Miller Brothers seller was said to have participated in "no
invasion or exploitation of the consumer market in Maryland. ' 34 It
is not easy to understand how General Trading solicitation, done
exclusively by the out-of-state seller's traveling salesmen, is consti-
tutionally different, for the purposes of the due process clause,
from the seller's deliveries and advertisement in Miller Brothers.
All of the activities in both cases were designed exclusively to cre-
ate and hold a market for the out-of-state seller's goods in the tax-
ing state. That is the stuff which the Court has declared satisfies
due process requirements. s5
In Miller Brothers the majority expressed concern that the
out-of-state seller could not know whether or not the goods it sold
over-the-counter would ultimately be used in the taxing state and
thus be taxed. The majority, however, failed to address the ques-
tion of whether the seller easily could have obtained knowledge
33. Id. at 347.
34. Id.
35. See General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 448 (1964).
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about the destination of the goods. This concern of the Miller
Brothers majority is not persuasive with respect to the goods seller
delivered to customers in the taxing state. The seller's records
surely showed where it delivered goods. In fact, the tax collection
suit against Miller Brothers was started by the seizing of one of the
seller's trucks, which was making deliveries of the seller's goods in
the taxing state.
There was a strong dissent in Miller Brothers. The dissenters
voted to sustain the Maryland use tax collecting device as applied
to this out-of-state seller, because the seller engaged in a course of
conduct that regularly injected its advertising into media reaching
local customers in the taxing state. Moreover, this out-of-state
seller regularly made local household deliveries of goods to custom-
ers within the taxing state by its own vehicles and by common car-
riers. The Miller Brothers dissent also notes that the seller would
be paid for the trouble of serving as tax collector.
In Miller Brothers the taxing state provided a viable market
for the out-of-state seller's goods; it conferred benefits on the
seller's trucks, which used the state's highways to deliver merchan-
dise to customers in the state. Further, the Miller Brothers deci-
sion places the local merchant in the taxing state at a competitive
disadvantage, because the local merchant must shoulder the tax to
pay for the benefits the state confers on the out-of-state seller.
Also, states have tried mail-order solicitation of sales through
advertisement by catalogs and "flyers" as a basis for requiring the
out-of-state seller to collect the use tax, even when the seller has
no other connections with the taxing state. Estimates of total mail-
order sales for 1985 range between fifty billion and one hundred
and fifty billion dollars.3 6 Mail-order solicitation of sales, however,
has not been a fruitful basis for requiring use tax collection by out-
of-state firms that solicit business in the taxing state by mailing
catalogs and other advertising items to in-state customers.
2. Bellas Hess
These attempts by states to require an out-of-state mail-order
seller to collect the use tax bring up the National Bellas Hess situ-
ation, or "can of worms. ' 37 This case brought to a halt the exten-
sion of use tax collection from out-of-state mail-order sellers. It is
a bone of contention in harvesting revenue today. The Bellas Hess
36. 43 Cong. Q. supra note 1, at 2572.
37.. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
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decision is the principal cause of the estimated annual loss of as
much as 1.5 billion dollars in use taxes each year.38 In Beltas Hess
the Court held that the State of Illinois could not require an out-
of-state mail-order company to collect use taxes when the mail-
order firm's only activity in the taxing state was the mailing of cat-
alogs and advertising flyers, and the delivery of the ordered goods
was by mail or common carrier. In Bellas Hess the Court, in a six
to three decision, struck down the attempt to collect the use tax on
both commerce and due process clause grounds.
The Bellas Hess decision is based upon a composite of viola-
tions of both the commerce clause and due process clause, al-
though the Court relied chiefly on the commerce clause as the con-
stitutional impediment to the collection requirement. In its
opinion the Bellas Hess Court stressed a sharp distinction that it
claimed had been drawn in earlier cases regarding a state's power
to impose use tax collection liability on an out-of-state mail-order
seller. In Bellas Hess the Court took the unalterable position that
prior cases demonstrated that a state could coerce use tax collec-
tion only when the mail-order seller had retail outlets or solicitors
in the taxing state. The Court, however, insisted that prior cases
made it clear that a state lacked the power to collect the use tax
from the out-of-state seller when the seller did "no more than com-
municate with customers in the State by mail or common carrier
as part of a general interstate business."39 The Bellas Hess major-
ity thought this distinction was valid and refused to obliterate it.
This distinction is unrealistic and outmoded.
In his Beltas Hess opinion, Justice Potter Stewart made out
the Court's best case for refusing, on commerce clause grounds, to
require the out-of-state mail-order seller to collect the use tax. The
opinion explains:
And if the power of Illinois (the taxing State) to impose use tax burdens upon
National (Bellas Hess, the out-of-state seller) were upheld, the resulting im-
pediments upon the free conduct of its interstate business would be neither
imaginary nor remote. For if Illinois can impose such burdens, so can every
other State, and so, indeed, can every municipality, every school district, and
every other political subdivision throughout the Nation with power to impose
sales and use taxes. The many variations in rates of tax, in allowable exemp-
tions, and in administrative and record-keeping requirements could entangle
National's interstate business in a virtual welter of complicated obligations to
local jurisdictions with no legitimate claim to impose a "fair share of the cost
of the local government." The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to
38. See supra note 2.
39. 386 U.S. at 758 (emphasis added).
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ensure a national economy free from such unjustifiable local entanglements. 0
3. The Bellas Hess Dissent
The three Bellas Hess dissenting Justices4 1 capsulized many of
the basic reasons that can be lodged against the Bellas Hess hold-
ing. Although Bellas Hess was decided before Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady,42 perhaps the four-pronged Complete Auto
Transit test for valid taxation involving interstate operations
should be kept in mind in analyzing the Bellas Hess dissent.
Under Complete Auto Transit, a tax on interstate commerce is
valid if it satisfies a four-pronged test: (1) the tax must be applied
to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state; (2)
the tax must be fairly apportioned; (3) the tax must not discrimi-
nate against interstate commerce; and (4) the tax must be fairly
related to the services provided by the taxing state.43 The first
prong is pertinent here, but the fourth prong of Complete Auto
Transit appears to have the most relevancy to the collection of the
use tax; the tax must be fairly related to the services provided by
the taxing state. With that observation in mind, one may analyze
properly the Bellas Hess dissent. The dissenters believed that the
out-of-state seller in Beltas Hess derived benefits through large-
scale, systematic, continuous solicitation and exploitation of the
taxing state's consumer markets.4 In the view of the Beltas Hess
dissent that activity constituted a sufficient connection between
Bellas Hess and the taxing state to require Bellas Hess to collect
the tax from the customers in the taxing state. Bellas Hess' use of
the taxing state's residents' credit resources, which are dependent
upon the taxing state's banking and credit institutions, further
strengthened the out-of-state seller's connection with the taxing
state.4 5 According to the Beltas Hess dissent, that out-of-state
seller could not carry on its business in the taxing state, and par-
ticularly its substantial credit business, without utilizing the taxing
state's banking and credit facilities.46 Moreover, the dissent
thought it reasonable to assume that Bellas Hess would take mea-
40. Id. at 759-60.
41. Justice Fortas wrote the dissent; and Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the
dissent.
42. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
43. Id. at 279.
44. 386 U.S. at 759-60.
45. Id. at 761-62.
46. Id. at 762.
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sures to collect its delinquent accounts in the taxing state by using
the state's facilities, perhaps including the courts.41
Nor were the Bellas Hess dissenters impressed by the Bellas
Hess majority's claim that administrative and record-keeping re-
quirements would entangle the seller's interstate business in a wel-
ter of complicated and expensive obligations. To that majority
fear, the dissent replied that the majority "vastly underestimate [d]
the skill of contemporary man and his machines." '48 A little later,
this Article will explore further what "contemporary man and his
machines" can do in the present-day context of technology and in-
terstate use tax collections.
Furthermore, the Bellas Hess dissenters pointed out that the
compliance burden on the out-of-state seller was no greater than
the burden on mail-order firms located in the taxing state, which
must collect sales and use taxes. In the dissent's view, Bellas Hess,
the out-of-state seller, was exploiting the taxing state's consumer
market by soliciting the state's residents who, absent the solicita-
tion, might buy in-state sellers' goods and pay the sales tax to sup-
port their own state government.49 Moreover, as the Bellas Hess
dissent saw it, to excuse Bellas Hess from its obligation to collect
the use tax would penalize retailers located in the taxing state, who
must collect a sales tax equal to the Bellas Hess use tax from their
customers. Thus, the local merchant who sold at retail was placed
at a competitive disadvantage with the out-of-state sellers who es-
caped the use tax.50
IV. THE NEED FOR REVIEW OF Bellas Hess: ITS REASONS ARE
OUTMODED
When the Supreme Court decided Bellas Hess in 1967, mail-
order sales were relatively small-about thirteen billion dollars an-
nually. This activity has grown vastly in recent years. For 1985 it
has been estimated that mail-order sales ranged between fifty bil-
lion and one hundred and fifty billion dollars.51 It has also been
estimated that as much as forty-five billion dollars worth of these
purchases were not taxed.2 Further, it has been estimated, as
47. Id.
48. Id. at 766.
49. Id. at 762.
50. For further treatment of Bellas Hess by the author, see P. HARTMAN, supra note 3,
at 626-631.
51. 43 Cong. Q., supra note 1, at 2571-72.
52. Id. at 2572.
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noted earlier, that annual total sales and use tax revenue losses are
in excess of one billion dollars.53
Because the Court decided Bellas Hess almost twenty years
ago in an era of more traditional sales methods, and because to-
day's increased use of more sophisticated communication methods
requires no physical presence, review and reversal of that decision
seem proper. Some of the recent technological changes in commu-
nications that make the Bellas Hess reasoning outmoded include
the growing use of toll-free (800) sales through newspapers, maga-
zine, and television ads; computer marketing via home computer
linkups; and new developments such as computer terminal "cata-
logs" for direct sales.5 4 One writer has described the concept of an
economic nexus in the realities of modern commercial operations
in this language:
The old "doing business" test based solely on physical presence was valid
when interstate business was conducted primarily face-to-face by traveling
salesmen. Today, in contrast, interstate business is regularly conducted elec-
tronically and by mail. Interstate consumer sales occur through computer ter-
minals located in homes and at retail outlets; consumer banking services are
available at detached electronic units; credit cards are issued by mail across
state lines and used for interstate retail transactions; and advertising by tele-
vision and by mail is commonplace. 5
Catalog selling, the issue in Bellas Hess, is now only one of a num-
ber of sales methods that do not require physical presence or direct
face-to-face contact by the buyer. The entire pursuit of business
takes on an entirely new meaning from that which existed in 1967
when Bellas Hess was decided.
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia impose sales
and use taxes. In addition, somewhere between 6,400 and 7,000 lo-
cal governments charge sales taxes, which account for nearly one-
third of all state revenues. 6 Furthermore, states increasingly have
been depending on the sales tax.57 The tremendous increase in in-
terstate sellers' use of sophisticated technological advances making
their products increasingly available to wide audiences will cause
mail-order sales to increase even more dramatically. According to
53. ACIR, supra note 2, at 7.
54. See supra text accompanying note 10.
55. See McCray, Overturning Bellas Hess: Due Process Considerations, 1985 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 265, at 286.
56. There is some discrepancy in the number of local taxing jursidictions. See 43 Cong.
Q. supra note 1, at 2573 (estimates 6,400); ACIR supra note 2, at 8 (estimates 7,000).
57. Between 1973 and 1983, the median state sales tax rose from 3.8 percent to 4.4
percent. During that period only New Mexico lowered its sales tax rate, and 29 States raised
their sales taxes. See 43 Cong. Q. supra note 1, at 2573.
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mail-order industry predictions, mail-order sales now represent ap-
proximately fifteen percent of all retail sales and could comprise
twenty percent of the total retail sales by 1990.58 By permitting
taxpayers who utilize the rapidly increasing mail-order sales indus-
try to avoid use tax payment only weakens the sales tax base, with
resulting state revenue losses.
On the other hand, the use of sophisticated technological ad-
vances in interstate sales operations should greatly reduce those
compliance burdens that the Bellas Hess Court feared would inex-
tricably entangle interstate business in a "virtual welter of compli-
cated obligations to State and local governmental jurisdictions," 5
which spelled the doom for use tax collection on commerce clause
grounds. Some of these technological aids to taxpayers will be ex-
plored further.
There are two ways to remove the Bellas Hess roadblock to
use tax collections. First, the Supreme Court could-and
should-relegate the Bellas Hess decision to the dustbin of uncon-
stitutional oblivion. Second, Congress likely has the power to ne-
gate that case. Bills are now pending before both houses of Con-
gress to overthrow Bellas Hess. Senate Bill 1510, designed to
accomplish that goal, is pending before the Senate Finance Com-
mittee, and hearings have been held on that bill. House Bill 3549 is
before the House Judiciary Committee.
To alleviate compliance burdens in collecting use taxes, the
bills before the Congress do not propose to force every small busi-
ness to master perhaps as many as 7,000 state and local tax struc-
tures. The bills would require collection only by large businesses.
This arrangement would spare small firms the financial and ad-
ministrative burdens of collecting the taxes and paying them to the
states. To reduce these compliance burdens on small businesses,
the proposed legislation would exempt sellers with sales below a
specified threshold dollar amount. Recommended exemptions vary
from 5 million dollars to 12.5 million dollars in annual gross sales,
Moreover, proposed statutes would require a single tax rate for
each state and its local governments that tax out-of-state compa-
nies. Each state would decide its own uniform rate. Even without
the aid of Congress, modern technological advances have greatly
eased accounting headaches and other compliance costs in keeping
track of the many different use tax rates.
58. 43 Cong. Q. supra note 1, at 2572.
59. 386 U.S. at 760.
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V. PROSPECTS OF A JUDICIAL REJECTION OF Bellas Hess
A. The Due Process Clause
Although the commerce clause appears to be the principal rea-
son for unhorsing the out-of-state seller's obligation to collect the
use tax in Bellas Hess, the Court indicated both due process and
commerce clause infirmities in the taxing state's collection system
as applied to the out-of-state mail-order seller. With reference to
the mix of commerce and due process clause impediments to the
collection of the tax, the Bellas Hess Court noted:
The test whether a particular State exaction is such as to invade the exclusive
authority of Congress to regulate trade between the States, and the test for a
State's compliance with the requirement of due process in this area are simi-
lar. . . .And in determining whether a State tax falls within the confines of
the Due Process Clause, the Court has said that the "single but controlling
question is whether the State has given anything for which it can ask return."
,. . The same principles have been held applicable in determining the power
of a State to impose the burdens of collecting use taxes upon interstate sales.
Here, too, the Constitution requires "some definite link, some minimum con-
nection, between a State and the person, property or transaction it seeks to
tax . . . .90
The Bellas Hess dissent made it clear that the taxing state did
give something "for which it can ask return." Moreover, between
the taxing state and the out-of-state mail-order seller there was
"some definite link, some minimum connection." What the Bellas
Hess dissenters had to say in 1967 is more compelling today. The
dissenters believed that the out-of-state seller derived benefits
through large-scale, systematic, continuous solicitation and ex-
ploitation of the taxing state's consumer market. The seller's use of
the taxing state's residents' credit resources, the taxing state's
banking and credit institutions, and the possible use of the taxing
state's courts to collect delinquent accounts further reinforce this
definite link and show that the state does give something "for
which it can ask return." The government of the taxing state con-
ferred benefits and gave support, protection, and opportunities in
the development of the consumer market. In addition to the obser-
vations of the Bellas Hess dissenters, the present-day out-of-state
mail-order seller, through sophisticated technological advances, has
further invaded the taxing state.61 Credit cards also are issued by
mail across state lines and used for interstate retail sales. Advertis-
ing by glorified, fancy, color catalogs and flyers has become com-
60. 386 U.S. at 756.
61. See supra text accompanying note 10.
1986] 1009
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
monplace. The out-of-state seller may be the recipient of proceeds
collected by the taxing state's credit facilities, including the courts.
Many of these advances in interstate mail-order selling were
foreign to the Court when it decided Bellas Hess in 1967. It seems
time for the Court to rethink its due process clause doctrines. Ra-
tionally, today's Supreme Court could find that the due process
clause is satisfied when a state collects a use tax from an out-of-
state mail-order seller in a Bellas Hess situation.
In the Bellas Hess opinion, the Court, perhaps significantly,
declared that "under the Constitution this is a domain where Con-
gress alone has power of regulation and control. 6 2 This observa-
tion may imply that congressionally defined standards for mail-or-
der use tax collection cases would satisfy both the due process and
commerce clause requirements. A recent Supreme Court decision
also gives some hope that the Court may now be using a more flex-
ible and realistic due process clause concept than it envisaged in
Bellas Hess.
In Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 3 decided in 1985, the Court was
faced with whether a sufficient nexus existed to give a state juris-
diction over an individual in an in personam law suit for breach of
contract. In Burger King the Court held that Florida's long-arm
statute, which extends jurisdiction over a nonresident who
breaches a contract in the state, could withstand due process
clause scrutiny when the defendant was a nonresident. In Burger
King the Court made a number of pertinent and realistic
statements:
Moreover, where individuals "purposefully derive benefit" from their in-
terstate activities,. . . it may well be unfair to allow them to escape having
to account in other States for consequences that arise proximately from such
activities; the Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial
shield to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed.
And because "modern transportation and communications have made it less
burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages
in economic activity," it usually will not be unfair to subject him to the bur-
dens of litigating in another forum for disputes relating to such activity.64
Then the Burger King Court mowed a verbal swath that seems to
afford a reasonable basis for scuttling Bellas Hess on the due pro-
cess clause question:
Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because
62. 386 U.S. at 760.
63. 105 S. Ct. 2174 (1985).
64. Id. at 2183 (emphasis added) (citing McGee v. International Life Insurance Co.,
355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)).
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the defendant did not physically enter the forum State. Although territorial
presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant's affiliation with a
State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of suit there, it is an ines-
capable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount of busi-
ness is transacted solely by mail and wire communications across state
lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which
business is conducted. So long as a commercial actor's efforts are "purpose-
fully directed" toward residents of another State, we have consistently re-
jected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal
jurisdiction there.6 5
Surely, an out-of-state mail-order seller's "commercial efforts are
'purposefully directed' toward the residents of another state. '86
B. The Commerce Clause
In derailing the collection of the use tax on out-of-state mail-
order sales, Bellas Hess places most of its emphasis on a fatal com-
merce clause flaw in the statute as it was applied there. The Court
insisted that to allow the taxing state to collect the use tax would
subject interstate commerce to a "welter of complicated obligations
to local jurisdictions. '6 7 "The very purpose of the Commerce
Clause," said the Bellas Hess Court, "was to ensure a national
economy free from such unjustifiable local entanglements. 6 8 As
suggested earlier, however, recent sophisticated technological ad-
vances in communications should sap much of the vitality of the
Bellas Hess commerce clause reasoning.
One modern advancement that should greatly alter the com-
merce clause reasoning is the increased use of computer software
in connection with automated accounting systems.6 9
The advent of automated accounting systems, so prevalent in most busi-
nesses in America today makes it possible for a nationally organized sales
concern to automatically bill and remit for the appropriate local tax in
65. 105 S. Ct. at 2184 (emphasis changed).
66. For a recent discussion of the due process clause aspects of Bellas Hess, see Mc-
Cray, supra note 54. Ms. McCray believes that judicial precedent warrants overturning Bel-
las Hess. Hers is an incisive, ambitious piece of legal writing that exhaustively treats the
various territorial aspects of the due process clause as it applies to different types of state
action.
67. 386 U.S. at 759-60.
68. Id. at 760.
69. The following information on the automated accounting system was furnished by
letter dated January 13, 1986 by an able, experienced attorney who has served in a high
position in the Sales and Use Tax Division of a state, and who is now representing many
state and local taxpayers. Thus, he has traveled both sides of the street. That attorney is
John R. Gregory, formerly the head of the Tennessee Sales and Use Tax Division; and pres-
ently a member of the law firm of Heiskell, Donelson, Bearman, Adams, Williams & Kirsch,
in Memphis, Tennessee.
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thousands of jurisdictions. The software program which would be used for
billing and tax purposes would identify taxpayers of a given political subdivi-
sion by their zip codes. The same operation which would generate shipping
and billing invoices would also accrue the appropriate state or local tax for
the zip code of destination for the shipment. The same programming would
also accumulate data for preparation of a Sales Tax Return for each applica-
ble jurisdiction. Additionally, the program could also accumulate total sales
for a given time period so that the mail-order house would have timely infor-
mation if they passed a sales threshold for reporting to a given state.
The difficulty in any programming of this nature is the constant updates
and modifications which would be required whenever a local taxing jurisdic-
tion changed its rates. The cost to a mail-order house of setting up a software
program of this type and the constant review and revision which would be
required to maintain its currency in a number of jurisdictions would be pro-
hibitive for many of the smaller wholesale houses. These vendors do not, to
our experience, have sufficient in-house programming personnel and data
processing capabilities to keep their State Sales Tax programs current.
Fortunately, the market has stepped in to fill this technological niche.
State Tax software programs are currently available in the market-place at a
cost which would not be prohibitive to the medium or large mail-order ven-
dor. Updates of this program are supplied by the fabricators of the software
for a nominal monthly or yearly maintenance fee. At $5,000 per software
package and a monthly maintenance agreement, which would cost a mini-
mum of several hundred dollars a year, programs in this price range would be
prohibitive, I believe, for a vendor whose annual gross sales were less than
$500,000 a year.7 0
VI. SUMMARY COMMENT ON JUDICIAL OVERTURNING OF Bellas
Hess
Bellas Hess is the judicial barricade to the collection of the
use taxes when the out-of-state seller has no physical presence in
the taxing state. In Bellas Hess the Court permitted an out-of-
state mail-order seller with no physical presence in the taxing state
to invade and exploit the consumer market with impunity. Bellas
Hess and other mail-order sellers with thick catalogs and fancy fly-
ers operate what virtually amounts to nationwide department
stores. At the time of Bellas Hess, the mail-order industry was
ringing up only about thirteen billion dollars in annual sales. Since
that time, consumers have gone on a mail-order shopping binge,
buying everything from expensive home computers and telephone
equipment to a vast array of clothing, household furnishings, and
other items sold by companies like American Express, Sharper Im-
age, Brookstone, and Lillian Vernon.71 No doubt this mail-order
70. To reduce the expense, Mr. Gregory thinks Congress should enact legislation al-
lowing out-of-state vendor's compensation for the overhead costs associated with collection
but should be phased out or sharply curtailed after gross sales reach a certain level in order
to avoid overcompensating a vendor for his collection duties.
71. See 43 Cong. Q., supra note 1, at 2571.
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buying binge from out-of-state sellers has been triggered, in part,
by the tax immunity afforded by Bellas Hess.
Marketing techniques have dramatically changed since Bellas
Hess was decided in 1967. Out-of-state mail-order sellers have used
sophisticated technological advances, such as toll-free (800) tele-
phone numbers and an array of computer hookups that facilitate
mail-order sellers in the invasion of the taxing states' consumer
markets for the capture of profits. The entire pursuit of business
has taken on an entirely new meaning.
To the extent that Bellas Hess insulates such out-of-state sell-
ers from collecting a use tax, the market states not only are de-
prived of an estimated 1.5 billion dollars in revenue annually, but
the failure to collect subverts the most effective available method
for bringing about equality of taxation between residents who buy
locally and those who buy from tax-exempt foreign mail-order sell-
ers. Maybe 1.5 billion dollars annually does not constitute a huge
revenue loss. But now that federal aid to states is being slashed,
every billion counts, especially when states are hard pressed to pay
for programs suddenly dropped in their laps by the federal govern-
ment. As the late United States Senator Everett M. Dirksen pur-
portedly proclaimed: "A billion here and a billion there, and pretty
soon you are getting into real money."
The absence of an enforceable use tax in this mail-order area
fosters an estimated forty-five billion dollars annually of vagabond
commerce. Foreign sellers enjoy the benefits of state and local gov-
ernments and the markets those governments afford, but do not
make any contribution whatsoever to support the governments.
Thus, these out-of-state sellers leave the tax burden to be
shouldered entirely by the local competition, which cannot escape
the responsibility to collect and remit the state sales tax. As the
New York Times put it: "The mail invasions are plainly unfair-to
store customers who pay the levies and to local businesses that
must compete with mail orders." 2
Of course, the in-state purchaser is still liable for the use tax
on retail goods he purchases from the foreign mail-order seller. It
is, however, virtually impossible for the states to identify these
purchasers. Even if the states could identify the purchasers, the
cost of collecting the use tax from the nonreporting purchaser
would be prohibitive.
An unrealistic facet of the Bellas Hess doctrine is that the
72. N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
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Court presumably thought that a few "warm bodies" in the taxing
state-either operating from an office, or traipsing around hawking
their wares without any in-state office-constitute a more satisfac-
tory nexus with a state, for constitutional purposes, than other
more substantial and meaningful connections. Benefits from the
taxing state that are unrelated to physical contact with the state
may be of vastly greater significance than those derived from the
presence of a whole swarm of the out-of-state seller's agents solicit-
ing business. Practically speaking, some form of physical presence
within the state in furtherance of a business purpose is not essen-
tial to the existence of a meaningful nexus with the state. As noted
earlier, in Burger King the Supreme Court recognized the realities
of the situation.73 The Court there declared that "it is an ines-
capable fact of modern commercial life that a substantial amount
of business is transacted solely by mail and wire communication
across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical presence
within a state in which the business is conducted. 7 4 An article in
Forbes relates a pertinent illustration of the Court's point as ap-
plied to use taxes on out-of-state mail-order sales. Forbes observed
that in 1983 American Express sold 2,500 plush fur coats, which
cost 1,000 dollars each, through the mails. IBM reportedly sold
twenty percent of its typewriter production without salesmen or
stores.
75
For use tax collection purposes, the connection or nexus be-
tween the taxing state and out-of-state mail-order sellers should be
an economic, rather than physical, relationship. When an out-of-
state mail-order seller, for the purpose of realizing a profit, takes
advantage of the taxing state's economic climate and milieu
through systematic, continuous, and large-scale solicitation of that
state's consumer market, that activity should constitute a connec-
tion or nexus sufficient to require the out-of-state seller to collect
the use tax. When the state provides a substantial economic bene-
fit to the production of income for the out-of-state seller, the tax-
ing state should be able to demand a tithe from the seller.
The Bellas Hess Court seems to think an out-of-state seller's
"warm bodies" in a taxing state are essential for a constitutional
nexus that requires the seller to collect a use tax. Businesses, how-
ever, prefer "cold computers" to "warm bodies" for transacting the
73. 105 S. Ct. at 2184.
74. Id.
75. Greene, A Boutique In Your Living Room, FORBES, May 7, 1984 at 86.
1014 [Vol. 39:993
MAIL-ORDER SALES
business that produces the dollars and cents.
VII. NEGATING Bellas Hess BY CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
A. Congressional Approaches to the Problem
As noted earlier, one method of requiring mail order houses to
collect use taxes on out-of-state sales is for Congress to negate Bel-
las Hess. As mentioned earlier, two bills have been introduced into
Congress for that purpose. In the Senate, Senate Bill 1510 has
been introduced; and in the House of Representatives, similar leg-
islation, House Bill 3549, has been introduced. Later, I will make
some additional comments about the content of these two bills.
There are two main approaches that Congress could take to
achieve the goal of legalizing use tax collection on out-of-state
mail-order sales. First, Congress could enact legislation that would
repudiate the Bellas Hess decision by requiring out-of-state mail-
order sellers to collect a state's use tax on interstate sales delivered
into the taxing state. Alternatively, Congress could impose a direct
federal tax on interstate mail-order sales at a uniform rate, and the
revenues could be distributed among the states.
If Congress takes no action in connection with the require-
ment that the seller collect the use tax, compliance cost burdens
associated with collecting and remitting the use tax in multiple ju-
risdictions would remain a serious problem, especially for the
smaller out-of-state sellers, even if the Court overrules Bellas Hess.
One advantage of congressional action that requires use tax collec-
tion on out-of-state sales is that it could reduce compliance cost
burdens, which constitute a very real problem. Forty-five states
and the District of Columbia impose sales and use taxes. In addi-
tion, between 6,400 and 7,000 local governments charge similar
taxes.7
6
In the absence of congressional action, compliance cost bur-
dens associated with sales tax collections in multiple jurisdictions
would be particularly burdensome for the smaller out-of-state
seller, which presumably would find it necessary to be familiar
with the tax laws in all the state and local taxing jurisdictions
where it makes sales. In view of the multiplicity of use tax rules in
different state and local governments, the mail-order seller woulcd
be saddled with high compliance cost burdens if it is required to
comply with the differing tax code provisions for forty-five states,
76. 43 Cong. Q., supra note 1, at 2572.
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the District of Columbia, and between 6,400 and 7,000 local gov-
ernments that now impose such taxes. In addition to rate differen-
tials, exempt items and taxed buyers vary a great deal from state
to state." This administrative burden could conceivably stifle some
interstate sales.
There are a number of possible approaches that Congress
could use to reduce compliance costs: (1) a de minimis rule (ex-
empt firms with sales below a certain threshold dollar amount); (2)
a uniform combined state and local tax rate for each state; (3) al-
low collection of state use taxes only (no use taxes by local govern-
ments); and (4) wider state use of percentage allowances to cover
collection costs.78
To amelioriate compliance cost burdens, the Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) has recommended
two features. ACIR has proposed congressional legislation that
would contain a de minimis rule exempting sales below a threshold
dollar amount. Additionally, the ACIR has recommended that
states in which there also are local use taxes could determine a
nondiscriminatory single rate for mall-order sales, consisting either
of (a) a state rate only, or (b) a combined state and local rate that
would apply at the option of the seller in lieu of the combined
state and local rates for all destination jurisdictions." There seems
to be broad-based support for the proposition that small firms
should be protected from high compliance costs.80
Compliance costs, however, may not be as unmanageable as
they might first appear. The out-of-state mail-order industry is
dominated in numbers by small firms, but in sales by a few large
firms. Applying a de minimis rule, the ACIR notes that a threshold
amount of five million dollars annually in gross sales would have
exempted ninety-six percent of the sellers in 1982 whose primary
classification was as mail-order firms, but would have covered sev-
enty-six percent of the sales in the same year; a similar sized distri-
bution appears to hold for firms that use mail-order sales as a sec-
ondary industry."1 Thus, using this de minimis rule, use tax
revenue could be collected on a large proportion of mail-order
sales, while tax collectors would only have to deal with a relatively
small number of out-of-state mall-order sellers. Congress would, of
77. ACIR, supra note 2, at 8.
78. Id. at 16.
79. Id. at 25.
80. Id. at 28.
81. Id. at 17.
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course, determine the de minimis amount, but five million dollars
annually in gross sales has been suggested as an appropriate
threshold sum. 8 2
Empirical studies of compliance costs show that they are high-
est for smaller firms.83 Thus, even from the revenue collection
standpoint, it would be cost effective to exempt small firms and
thereby reduce the state's high collection costs in collecting rela-
tively small amounts of revenue through a number of small sellers.
As noted earlier, one method for reaching use taxes on inter-
state sales is the enactment of a direct federal sales tax on inter-
state mail-order sales. Congress would set the tax rate and would
distribute the collected revenue among the states according to
some proxy for mall-order purchases, such as population, personal
income, or state retail sales.84 One attractive feature of this method
of taxing interstate sales lies in its relative simplicity. Congres-
sional action to overturn Bellas Hess would not be required, and
this approach would minimize compliance costs for firms by pro-
viding a single rate for all out-of-state mail-order sales.85 Thus,
compliance costs should be no different from costs for an in-state
firm. This approach should have fewer constitutional problems
than a congressional statute requiring out-of-state mail-order sell-
ers to collect state use taxes on interstate sales.
On the other hand, a national tax on interstate mail-order
sales would represent the greatest degree of federal intrusion into
state and local affairs. Thus, corrective congressional legislation re-
quiring out-of-state mail-order sellers to collect state use taxes on
interstate sales delivered into the state that imposes the use tax on
the purchaser is the more likely approach.
B. The Constitutional Power of Congress To Overturn Bellas
Hess
If Congress passes corrective federal legislation that enables
states to enforce use tax collection from out-of-state sellers, thresh-
old constitutional questions must be faced. Congressional action
would be met with commerce clause and due process clause ob-
structions. While Bellas Hess seems primarily a commerce clause
82. Id. at 25; 43 Cong. Q., supra note 1, at 2573. H.R. 3549, now before the House of
Representatives, would apply only to mail-order firms with sales exceeding five million
dollars.
83. ACIR, supra note 2, at 28.
84. Id. at 31.
85. Id. at 28.
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decision,"6 the due process clause also was involved. The Court did
indicate that the nature of the limitation imposed by the two
clauses is closely related in use tax collections. 7 In referring to the
commerce clause and the due process clause objections to the Bel-
las Hess tax, the Court noted: "These two claims are closely re-
lated."'8 Further, the Court noted that the tests of whether a par-
ticular state's action "violates the Commerce Clause and Due
Process Clause 'requirements' . . . in this area are similar."89
In Bellas Hess the Court virtually invited Congress, under its
interstate commerce responsibilities, to act in the area of use tax
collection on out-of-state mail-order sellers. While striking down
the Bellas Hess tax, the Court referred to the purpose of the com-
merce clause and declared that "under the Constitution, this is a
domain where Congress has the power of regulation and control."90
That remark may be a judicial suggestion that Congress possesses
power to control both commerce clause and due process limitations
on state taxation of interstate commerce.
1. The Power of Congress to Remove the Commerce Clause
Barrier to Negating Bellas Hess
There would seem to be little, if any, doubt that Congress does
possess power to remove the Bellas Hess commerce clause curb on
the states' power to collect use taxes on out-of-state mail-order
sales. As late as 1984, the Court made a significant supportive
statement to this effect. In South-Central Timber Development,
Inc. v. Wunnicke91 the Court noted: "It is equally clear that Con-
gress may redefine the distribution of power over interstate com-
merce by permit[ting] the states to regulate the commerce in a
manner which would otherwise not be permissible. '92 Wunnicke
cites several supporting cases, including the landmark case of Pru-
86. For a discussion by the author of the relationship between the commerce clause
and the due process clause, including the overlapping of the two, see P. HARTmAN, supra
note 3, §§ 2:1, 2:3.
87. 386 U.S. at 756.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 759-60.
90. Professor Jerome R. Hellerstein, a leading authority in the field of state taxation,
thinks National Bellas Hess is only a commerce clause decision. See "ACIR Considers Leg-
islative Repeal of National Bellas Hess Case Restrictions on State Use Taxes," Tax Notes,
March 18, 1985, 1073.
91. 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
92. Id. at 87 (quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945)).
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dential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, s which will be discussed later.
Congressional permission for states to regulate and tax inter-
state commerce in a manner that would otherwise not be permissi-
ble runs through the whole fabric of constitutional doctrine. It has
numerous legislative illustrations, and it has received unbroken ju-
dicial approval. As early in our constitutional history as 1789, Con-
gress passed a statute that placed pilots for interstate commerce
under state law. This pilotage law was upheld in the historic case
of Cooley v. Board of Wardens.9 4 A number of earlier, well-known
illustrations of congressional consent to state action have been in
connection with states' efforts to control interstate traffic in intoxi-
cating liquors. When Congress consented to state action that oth-
erwise would not have been valid because of the commerce clause,
the Court sustained the congressional consent.9 5 Congressional ac-
tion also cleared the way for state action dealing with interstate
shipment of convict-made goods. Congress consented to state ac-
tion that prohibited the sale of convict-made goods, and the state
law was sustained."' Likewise, Congress consented to the construc-
tion of a bridge across a navigable river after the Court had invali-
dated state legislation authorizing such construction before the
congressional consent was given. The Court validated the congres-
sional action. 7
The "undoubted power" of Congress to "redefine the distribu-
tion of power over interstate commerce" 98 is found in state taxa-
tion, as well as regulatory matters. It has been well recognized that
the plenary power of Congress over interstate commerce extends to
consent to state taxes affecting such commerce. Both before and
after the validity of congressional consent to state taxation
squarely was called into question, the Court has indicated in vari-
ous opinions that Congress could clear away the commerce clause
93. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
94. 53 U.S. 299 (1852).
95. Clark Distilling Co. v. Western M.E. Co., 242 U.S. 311 (1917); In re Rahrer, 140
U.S. 545 (1891).
96. Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois C.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937); Whitfield v.
Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936).
97. After the Court upset state legislation authorizing a bridge across the Ohio River
in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518 (1952), the Court had no
difficulty in reversing its position after Congress had given permission by statute to the
presence of the bridge. In Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421
(1856) the Court sustained the state act authorizing the bridge after Congress, in exercising
its power over interstate commerce, consented to the state's action.
98. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945).
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hurdle to state taxes.99
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,'0 apparently for the
first time, called for a square holding on the validity of congres-
sional consent to state taxation of interstate commerce. This litiga-
tion involved a state unemployment tax, and Congress had pro-
vided that the employer should not be "relieved from compliance
therewith on the ground that he is engaged in interstate or foreign
commerce."'' 11 In sustaining the tax, the Court disposed of the ar-
gument against the power of Congress to consent to the tax in one
all-embracing sentence. Declared Chief Justice Stone: "It is no
longer debatable that Congress, in the exercise of the commerce
power, may authorize the states, in specified ways, to regulate in-
terstate commerce or impose burdens upon it."' 02
One of the most conspicuous examples of judicial acceptance
of congressional consent to an otherwise invalid state tax on inter-
state commerce is Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin.0 3 That
case called into question the validity of a South Carolina statute
that imposed a tax on the premiums of insurance policies written
by foreign insurance companies. No similar tax was imposed on
South Carolina corporations. The tax was supported by an act of
Congress consenting to taxation. The 1945 congressional enact-
ment, known as the McCarran-Ferguson Act, provided in part:
"The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the
regulation or taxation of such business."'' The Act had been
passed to remove doubts about the continued operation of state
laws after the Supreme Court had decided in 1944 that the busi-
ness of insurance was interstate commerce, and thus subject to an-
titrust regulation. 10 5 Prudential maintained that the South Caro-
lina tax was an invalid discrimination against interstate commerce
and that the McCarran-Ferguson Act was invalid because it ex-
ceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The Act was held valid,
99. E.g., State Board of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451, 456 n.4 (1962);
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1949); Gwin,
White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 441 (1939). For a discussion by the author
of Congress' power to sweep away the commerce clause restraint on state taxation of inter-
state commerce, see P. HARTMAN, supra note 3, § 13:5.
100. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
.101. Id. at 315.
102. Id.
103. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (a) (1982).
105. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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and although the South Carolina tax statute discriminated against
interstate commerce since it taxed only foreign insurance compa-
nies, it was sustained because Congress had consented.
In its rationale the Prudential Court stressed that the com-
merce clause is a grant of power to Congress and not a limitation
on that power. Further, the Court noted that the broad congres-
sional purpose was to support the existing and future state systems
for regulating and taxing the insurance business.108 By releasing
state powers held in restraint by Congress' "exclusive" power of
regulation of interstate commerce, Congress had permitted the
States to legislate in a manner previously forbidden them.10 7 The
Prudential Court declared that the plenary power of Congress over
interstate commerce "enables Congress not only to promote but
also to prohibit interstate commerce, as it has done frequently and
for a great variety of reasons."10 8 In Prudential Congress had re-
moved the commerce clause barrier to the state tax. The Court
sustained the congressional action.
In Prudential the Court also noted significantly that it has re-
peatedly accepted congressional judgment that redefined the scope
of proper state activity in interstate commerce, even when that
judgment had the effect of overturning prior Court decisions.10 9
Prudential expressly notes that "in each instance [the Court] has
given effect to the congressional judgment contradicting [the
Court's] own previous one."11  That view should be applicable to a
congressional enactment negating the Court's decision in Bellas
Hess. Recently, in White v. Massachusetts,1 the Court declared
that when "state or local action is specifically authorized by Con-
gress, it is not subject to the Commerce Clause even if it interferes
with interstate commerce." 1 2
To be sure, none of the cases mentioned in which the Court
upheld congressional consent to otherwise invalid state action has
involved the collection of a state use tax. The rationale of the
cases, however-especially those regarding congressional consent
106. 328 U.S. at 429.
107. Id. at 429-30.
108. Id. at 434.
109. Id. at 423-24.
110. Id. at 424. More recently the Court has sustained the power of Congress, under
the McCarran Act, to consent to state taxation of interstate insurance, even though the tax
may be discriminatory. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization,
451 U.S. 648 (1981).
111. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
112. Id. at 213.
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to otherwise invalid state taxes-should support congressional con-
sent to the collection of a use tax from an out-of-state mail-order
seller.
2. The Due Process Clause Barrier
Bellas Hess may be primarily a commerce clause case, but a
due process clause question also is involved in collection of the use
tax from out-of-state sellers. Both the commerce clause and due
process clause hurdles would have to be crossed for legislation to
be valid. In Bellas Hess the validity of the use tax collection from
the out-of-state mail-order seller was challenged on both due pro-
cess clause and commerce clause grounds. Moreover, the Court
pointed out that the principles for determining a state's power to
impose the burdens of collecting use taxes upon interstate sales
may be the same as the test for determining whether a state's im-
position of a tax falls within the confines of the due process
clause.113 The Bellas Hess opinion also used language from a due
process clause use tax collection case, when the Court stated that
the "Constitution requires 'some definite link, some minimum con-
nection,' between the state and the person, property or transaction
it seeks to tax." 1 4 Further, the Bellas Hess Court observed: "And
in determining whether a State tax falls within the confines of the
Due Process Clause, the Court has said that the 'simple but con-
trolling question is whether the State has given anything for which
it can ask return.' " 1I
In Miller Brothers the Court struck down, solely on territorial
due process clause grounds, the collection of a use tax from an out-
of-state seller who both delivered goods and advertised by newspa-
pers and radio in the taxing state.11 6
It hardly would be safe to assume that a full-blown due pro-
cess clause attack would not be launched against any corrective
legislation Congress might enact to enable states to enforce use tax
collection from out-of-state sellers.
There are some random Supreme Court statements, by way of
dicta, that cast some doubt on Congress' ability to remove the due
process clause barrier when states try to collect use taxes from out-
of-state mail-order sellers. In Mississippi University for Women v.
113. 386 U.S. at 756.
114. Id. (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 343, 344-45 (1954)).
115. 386 U.S. at 756.




Hogan117 Justice O'Connor, speaking for the Court, stated that
Congress has no more power than does a state legislature to "vio-
late a law that denies the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment."1 ' That case held that it was a violation of the equal
protection clause for a state university to limit enrollment in its
nursing school to women. Then, by way of dicta, the Court stated
that an attempt by Congress to exempt the university from the
requirements of the fourteenth amendment would be unconstitu-
tional. Civil rights, of course, were involved in Hogan. Congress'
power to restrict due process in civil rights matters likely would be
more closely scrutinized than a congressional enactment in the fed-
eralism context of state taxation.
Justice O'Connor had made essentially the same point in a dif-
ferent context in her dissent in ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax
Commission."9 In ASARCO the Court invalidated, on territorial
due process clause grounds, a state income tax law applied to a
multistate operation. In her dissent Justice O'Connor noted that
the due process barrier to state taxation "may be beyond Con-
gress's power to correct. 12 0 Justice Powell, who spoke for the
ASARCO Court, addressed Justice O'Connor's concerns by noting
that the issue was not before the Court, because no relevant fed-
eral legislation had undertaken to remove the due process clause
obstacle. 12 1 Justice Powell did observe that the limitations on state
taxing power do not apply to the federal government, but he re-
fused to express an opinion on the scope of federal authority to
legislate in this area.12 2 In dictum the Court also has noted in an-
other connection that "Congress does not have final say as to what
constitutes due process under the Fourteenth Amendment."'23
That statement does not mean, however, that the Court might not
accept Congress' judgment as to what constitutes due process.
The Court might well find due process clause protection has
more elasticity in the context of fiscal matters in federalism than
the clause does in a civil rights context. Thus, the Court might well
accept congressional judgment in defining the scope of due process,
even though that judgment effectively negates the Court's decision
117. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
118. Id. at 732.
119. 458 U.S. 307 (1982).
120. Id. at 350.
121. Id. at 327 n.23.
122. Id.
123. State Board of Insurance v. Todd, 370 U.S. 451, 457 (1962).
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in Bellas Hess.124 This action could be effected more readily be-
cause Congress would not be restricting due process in the context
of fundamental constitutional rights or suspect classifications.
When legislation, rather than dealing with economic or resource
allocation-including state taxation-creates classifications that
affect the rights of the individual, the equal protection clause im-
poses a much stricter curb on state action.125 The due process
clause, however, should not impose such strict constraints on the
collection of the use tax from out-of-state mail-order sellers. Since
congressional action requiring the out-of-state mail-order seller to
collect use taxes would involve regulating economic matters in the
federal system, the Court, one hopes, would find sufficient flexibil-
ity in the due process clause to uphold action taken by Congress if
it should make the watershed decision of defining due process for
use tax collection purposes. After all, the out-of-state mail-order
seller is not the party taxed; it is only required to collect the tax,
and has no liability if the tax is collected from the purchaser, who
is the taxpayer. Such coerced collection by the out-of-state mail-
order seller would not hobble or impede the workings of our fed-
eral system. Nor should such collection unconstitutionally impinge
upon the out-of-state mail-order sellers' activity of skimming the
cream off the consumer market.
There are precedents for congressional assistance to the states
in resolving interstate problems that exceed the power of the states
when acting alone. In a number of those instances, the precedent
was established over both commerce clause and due process clause
attacks. A congressional enactment that would enable states to en-
force use tax collection from out-of-state mail-order sellers should
not have a fatal due process clause flaw.
As noted earlier, in Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois
Central Railroad12 the Court sustained the constitutionality of a
congressional enactment prohibiting the interstate transportation
of articles made by convict labor into states that had prohibited
the sale of such goods. The Court upheld this congressional legisla-
tion as a valid exercise of Congress' plenary power over interstate
commerce. The Court rejected the argument that because the law
aided state policy it was arbitrary or capricious and a violation of
due process. Said the Court: "In the congressional action there is
124. Prudential, 328 U.S. at 424.
125. J. HELLERSTEIN, supra note 9, at § 3.2; P. HARTMAN, supra note 3, at ] 3:1]0.
126. 299 U.S. 334 (1937).
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nothing arbitrary or capricious bringing the statute into collision
with the requirements of due process of law .... The fact that it
has adopted its rule in order to aid the enforcement of valid state
laws affords no ground for constitutional objection."'127
Other illustrations show Congress' power to aid state policy
when acting under its commerce clause power. Moreover, there was
no due process clause roadblock to the congressional legislation. As
noted above, in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railroad
Co. 128 the Court upheld the power of Congress in the Webb-Ken-
yon Act to prevent interstate transportation of liquor to states
where receipt and possession of liquor were prohibited by state
law. The statute weathered both a commerce clause and a due pro-
cess clause attack. After finding that the commerce clause power
enabled Congress to pass this statute, the Court then addressed
the due process clause question. The Clark Court considered the
due process clause of both the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
The Court said:
It is only necessary to point out that the considerations which we have stated
dispose of all contentions that the Webb-Kenyon Act is repugnant to the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment, since what we have said concerning
that clause in the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to state power, is
decisive. 2
9
Holding that the states had power to enact the prohibition law
consistent with the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, the Clark Court stated:
That government can, consistently with the due process clause, forbid the
manufacture and sale of liquor and regulate its traffic, is not open to contro-
versy; and that there goes along with this power full police authority to make
it effective, is also not open.. . . This being true, there can be no doubt that
the West Virginia prohibition law did not offend against the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 30
Also, Congress has assisted the states by passing legislation to curb
cigarette tax evasion by interstate mail order,' 3 ' as well as by
transportation across state lines.13 2
In the above instances Congress recognized that the state bor-
ders and limited state jurisdiction create insuperable state
problems that can be resolved only by congressional action. The
127. Id. at 352.
128. 242 U.S. 311 (1917).
129. Id. at 332.
130. Id. at 320.
131. 15 U.S.C. §§ 375-78 (1982).
132. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2341-44 (1982).
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pressing need to curb use tax collection evasion by out-of-state
mail-order sales in order to protect state revenues and to eliminate
any competitive disadvantage to local merchants, who are required
to collect the sales tax, should fall within this category of congres-
sional assistance to the states in furtherance of state policies to
collect use taxes on out-of-state mail-order sales.
The due process clause of the fifth amendment should not
limit the exercise of congressional power to negate Bellas Hess.
Unlike the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the
fifth amendment due process clause has no territorial limits within
the United States. Seemingly, a rational basis for such an economic
regulation could be found in use tax collection from out-of-state
mail-order sellers. Because Congress is not bound by the territorial
limits of the individual states, Congress should have the power to
consent to state laws that permit the collection of a use tax im-
posed upon a mail-order sale made beyond the borders of each
state.
One authority in this area of the law, Professor William Cohen
of Stanford Law School, suggests that Congress should be able to
consent to the state tax invalidated in ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho Tax
Commission,'" even though the Court unhinged the tax on four-
teenth amendment due process clause grounds because the state
taxed transactions beyond its borders.1 34 As Cohen explains,
My thesis, however, is that Congress should be able to remove constitutional
limits on State power if those limits stem solely from division of power within
the federal system. In other words, Congress should be able to approve un-
constitutional policy choices in state law when Congress is not constitution-
ally prohibited from directly adopting the same policy itself. In appropriate
circumstances, Congress should be able to authorize the states to enact legis-
lation that, in the absence of congressional consent, would run afoul of due
process or equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment ....
Professor Cohen, however, does place limits on the extent to which
Congress could validate unconstitutional state action: "Moreover,
my thesis would not permit Congress to ignore constitutional lim-
its on its own power. Thus, ordinary federal legislation cannot
eliminate constitutional guarantees of individual liberty that are
applicable to the states and Congress alike."136 Professor Cohen
recognizes that the answer to whether Congress has power to enact
133. 458 U.S. 307 (1983).
134. See Cohen, Congressional Power To Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A
Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REv. 387, 412-13 (1983).




the constitutional legislation itself often will be unsettled and
controversial. 37
In suggesting that Congress could remove the due process
clause limitations of the fourteenth amendment, which were fatal
to the state tax in ASARCO, Professor Cohen points out that those
limitations applied in ASARCO were the states' power to tax
transactions beyond their borders. Those limitations are not appli-
cable to federal regulation; hence Congress should be able to re-
move them.
Applying these principles to Bellas Hess, even if the collection
of the tax met its Waterloo under fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess limitations, Congress should be able to remove those limita-
tions, because the fourteenth amendment due process clause does
not apply to the federal government. The same reasoning, of
course, would permit Congress to remove the Court's Bellas Hess
commerce clause obstruction, because the commerce clause is a
grant of power to Congress-not a limitation on congressional
power.'3 8
Because the only due process constraint on congressional ac-
tion is the fifth amendment, what substantive due process stan-
dards apply to congressional economic legislation? Congress would
face this situation should it undertake to negate Bellas Hess.
If the due process standards in United States v. Carolene
Products Co.'39 are applied, perhaps a congressional statute requir-
ing collection of the use tax by an out-of-state mall-order seller
could weather a fifth amendment due process clause storm. In
Carolene Products the Court considered the validity of a fifth
amendment due process assault on a congressional statute that
prohibited the interstate shipment of "filled" milk. In turning back
the attack, the Court responded through Justice Stone, who said
that "where the legislative judgment is drawn in question, [the in-
quiry] must be restricted to the issue whether any state of facts
either known or which could reasonably be assumed, affords sup-
port for [the legislation].' 4 0 Although the Court found sufficient
facts in Carolene Products to support the finding of a rational ba-
sis for the statute, nevertheless Justice Stone emphasized that,
even absent these legislative findings, the Court would have upheld
the legislation because "the existence of facts supporting the legis-
137. Id.
138. See Prudential, 328 U.S. at 423.
139. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
140. Id. at 154.
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lative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affect-
ing ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced un-
constitutional unless . . it is of such a character as to preclude
the assumption that it rests on some rational basis."
u41
It is thus plain that the Court gives great deference to Con-
gress' economic judgment. 14 2 Applying the Carolene Products stan-
dards to the validity of a congressional enactment requiring an
out-of-state mail-order seller to collect a state use tax, Congress
should have a rational basis for aiding state policy and requiring
the collection. Those reasons have been stressed throughout much
of this Article.
VIII. SUMMARY COMMENT AND CONCLUSIONS ON COLLECTION OF
USE TAXES FROM OUT-OF-STATE MAIL-ORDER SELLERS
No definitive judicial decisions deal with either (1) overturning
Beltas Hess or (2) sustaining congressional legislation that would
negate Belas Hess. On both counts, however, the prospects should
be pretty good for escaping the limitations Bellas Hess places on
the collection of state use taxes from out-of-state mail-order sell-
ers. The seller in Bellas Hess, as noted by the dissent, derived ben-
efits from the taxing state through large-scale, systematic, continu-
ous solicitation and exploitation of that state's consumer market.
Even if Bellas Hess is overruled by the Court, some congres-
sional action should prove useful in establishing fair compliance
costs. There appears to be no adequate judicial machinery to es-
tablish such costs. Spasmodic and unrelated litigation of use tax
collections from out-of-state mail-order sellers cannot establish
reasonable guidelines for compliance costs that are fair to both the
taxing state and the out-of-state mail-order seller who must collect
the use tax. Whether Bellas Hess receives its just demise at the
hands of the Court or in the halls of Congress, reasonable compli-
ance costs should be established. As noted earlier, a de minimis
rule should be applied, which would exempt all sellers with gross
sales below a fixed dollar amount. In addition, a uniform rate is
needed when both state and local sales taxes are imposed. These
are the two main factors in the establishment of compliance costs.
The ACIR has put forth a legislative proposal for adoption by
Congress for corrective federal legislation that would enable states
141. Id. at 152.
142. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUB-
STANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.4 (1986) (Court continues to pay high deference to Congress).
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to enforce use tax collection. That proposal is worth noting in full:
The Commission recognizes that significant changes have occurred in the
composition and technology of the retail sales market in the 18 years since
National Bellas Hess. It is also keenly aware of the need to equalize the com-
petitive position of the in-state and out-of-state vendors and to safeguard
state sales and use tax bases and revenues. To achieve these aims, the Com-
mission recommends that Congress enact legislation that would negate the
National Bellas Hess decision by requiring mail order vendors to collect a
state's use tax on interstate sales delivered in that state, if the mail order
vendor engages in regular or systematic solicitation of sales in that state
through catalogs, advertising, or other means. To relieve the compliance cost
burden on small businesses, the legislation should contain a de minimis rule,
exempting vendors with national sales and/or sales in the destination state
below a specified threshold dollar amount. The de minimis figure(s) should
be determined by Congress, but should be no less than ($5 million) ($12.5
million) in gross sales. To minimize compliance costs for firms operating in
multiple jurisdictions, states in which there are local sales and use taxes
should determine a non-discriminatory single rate, either (a) the state rate
only or (b) a combined state and local rate that the out-of-state seller may
elect to charge in lieu of applying the combined state and local rates for all
jurisdictions which are the destinations of the sales.' 43
The use of a state rate only, or a combined state and local rate
that the out-of-state seller may elect to pay, could greatly reduce
compliance costs burdens for a far-flung out-of-state seller. It
would reduce the number of use tax rates facing a multistate firm
to a maximum of 46, rather than the estimated 6,400 to 7,000 local
taxing jurisdictions with which the seller might be faced in the use
tax collection process.144 At the present time, 45 states and the
District of Columbia, plus upwards of 7,000 local governments, im-
pose sales and use taxes.145
Of course, the cut-off of small business from the requirement
of collecting the use tax meets opposition. It would give an unfair
competitive advantage to companies falling below the floor. The
proposed congressional net catches the large fish, but lets the small
ones slip through.
The importance of relegating Bellas Hess to the ash can is
demonstrated by the mushrooming of mail-order sales by out-of-
state sellers, and predictions are that the mail-order business will
take over a larger portion of the market. In part, this increase in
sales is attributable to the development of sophisticated technolog-
ical advances in communications. It also has been suggested that
the Bellas Hess decision caused the out-of-state mall-order busi-
143. ACIR, supra note 2, at 25.




ness to spiral. Technological changes in communications and auto-
mated accounting systems, when coupled with the two main fea-
tures of the proposed congressional legislation, seem to take most
of the sting out of the Bellas Hess Court's claim that use tax col-
lection could involve interstate business in a welter of complicated
obligations and entanglements, especially in local jurisdictions.
Thus, there is little reason why the leak in the state and local reve-
nue dike resulting from the inability to collect the use tax on out-
of-state mail-order sales should not be plugged by negating Bellas
Hess through judicial and/or congressional action. This action
would remove the competitive advantage enjoyed by the out-of-
state seller over the local seller.
So long as we have a federal system of government, the taxa-
tion of multistate businesses will cause controversy. The collection
of the use tax from out-of-state mall-order sellers generates its
share of that controversy. There must, of course, be a proper ac-
commodation between the interests of the states' taxing power and
the proper concerns of the Nation. The economic growth of the
Nation must not be hobbled by unreasonable and myopic state and
local tax policies that not only would create retaliation and trade
wars among the states, but also would stunt the national economic
growth from which the federal and state governments must collect
enormous and burgeoning amounts of taxes.
Sophisticated modern technological developments have caused
out-of-state mail-order sales to flourish, accompanied by
mushrooming amounts of use taxes that cannot be collected from
those out-of-state sellers, so long as Bellas Hess remains misguided
law. Under technological advances, the present-day out-of-state
mail-order seller has invaded the consumer market of the taxing
state for the generation of profits through toll-free (800) telephone
sales and through newspaper, magazine, radio, and television ad-
vertisements placed by the seller. Additionally, the out-of-state
seller uses computer marketing via home computer linkups, and
new developments such as computer terminal "catalogs" for direct
sales have been placed in such readily available places as factory
cafeterias, supermarkets, and other strategic locations. These easily
accessible technological advances enable the out-of-state mail-or-
der seller to engage in market-creating and market-supporting ac-
tivities, which have been thought by the Court to be hallmarks for
satisfying commerce clause and due process clause requirements in
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the area of multistate taxation. 146 On the other side of the shield,
sophisticated technological advances have greatly sapped much of
the Bellas Hess judicially perceived "welter of entanglements" ar-
gument thought by the Court to outlaw the collection of the Bellas
Hess tax. Thus, the increased use of computer software in connec-
tion with automated accounting systems makes it possible for a na-
tionally organized sales concern automatically to bill and remit for
the appropriate state and local tax in thousands of jurisdictions.
Consequently, satisfactory reconciliation of the competing de-
mands of a proper, workable balance between state and national
interests would not unreasonably be hampered or curtailed by the
collection of the use tax from out-of-state mail-order sellers, espe-
cially when coupled with congressional clearing of this use tax col-
lection briar patch.
146. See General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 448 (1964).
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